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Most Quantum Key Distribution protocols using a two-dimensional basis such as HV polarization
as first proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, are limited to a key generation density of 1 bit
per photon. We increase this key density by encoding information in the transverse spatial displace-
ment of the used photons. Employing this higher-dimensional Hilbert space together with modern
single-photon-detecting cameras, we demonstrate a proof-of-principle large-alphabet Quantum Key
Distribution experiment with 1024 symbols and a shared information between sender and receiver
of 7 bit per photon.
I. INTRODUCTION
Human society relies increasingly on the availability of
affordable and high speed communication, which fosters
the need of high key-rate generating cryptography. Re-
cent progress in the development of quantum computers
[1–5] threatens the widely used cryptographic methods,
which rely on computational assumptions [6, 7]. A pos-
sible solution is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) of
which the security is only based on quantum physics and
not on any computational assumption. The first QKD
protocol BB84 [8] uses the two-dimensional polarization
basis to encode information in photons. Therefore, the
alphabet is limited to two symbols, ”0” and ”1”, with a
maximum information content of 1 bit per photon. Since
the generated key is used as a one-time pad, this is a
bottleneck especially for encrypted video communication
[9].
There are two approaches to increase the key genera-
tion rate. One is to increase the repetition rates of pho-
ton generation [10] and detection [11], which is inherently
limited by dead times and jitter of the detectors [12].
The other approach is to exploit properties of photons
besides the polarization to increase the dimensionality of
the Hilbert space [13, 14]. A higher dimensional Hilbert
space leads to a higher information content of the photons
and finally increases the key generation rate. Moreover,
the error rates introduced by eavesdropping are larger,
resulting in an increased security [15–17].
Several methods of high-dimensional QKD have
been demonstrated, including time-bin [18–21], orbital
angular-momentum [22–25] and transverse momentum
[26, 27]. Comparing the last two spatial encoding
schemes, transverse momentum states have the follow-
ing advantages. Assuming a realistic sender-receiver con-
figuration with finite-size apertures, a diffraction-limited
spot translated in an x,y-plane has a higher capacity
limit than the pure OAM states, since they form a sub-
set of Laguerre-Gauss modes [28, 29]. Together with the
ease of generating a Fourier-transformed mutually unbi-
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ased basis with lens optics, spatial translation states of
single photons is a promising candidate for very-high-
dimensional QKD.
In principle a scan mirror could be used to spatially
translate single photons. However, to correct for distur-
bances a Spatial Light Modulator (SLM) is more flexible
and also allows to use wavefront-shaping methods [30].
The SLM allows to change the phase and amplitude of a
wavefront by use of holographic methods.
In this paper we experimentally demonstrate very-
high-dimensional QKD with 1024 distinguishable sym-
bols in two mutually unbiased bases with a shared infor-
mation of 7 bit per sifted photon. This value is higher
than previously reported values of 2.05 bit for OAM
states [23] and comparable to the values demonstrated
in time-energy QKD [20]. We give finite-key security
arguments for claiming an error-corrected and privacy-
amplified secret-key rate of the final key of more than
0.5 bit per photon.
II. EXPERIMENT
We implement a high-dimensional version of the BB84
protocol using the x,y spatial translation of single pho-
tons to encode information [26, 31]. A detailed descrip-
tion of our setup is given in the supplemental material.
The working principle of the protocol is illustrated in
Fig. 1. We define detection areas on the two-dimensional
plane representing the symbols of our alphabet. The de-
tection areas span 10 × 10 pixels on our single-photon
sensitive detector. All the areas are arranged in a two-
dimensional grid of 32× 32 symbols. In this way, we are
able to encode d = 322 = 1024 symbols in total, which al-
lows a theoretical maximum of Imax = 10 bit encoded in a
single photon. The protocol requires a second, mutually
unbiased, basis to guarantee that a measurement in the
wrong basis yields no information. In general it is always
possible to use a Fourier transform to form this second
basis. In optics, a single lens performs this task. There-
fore, Alice and Bob both switch between an imaging path
and a Fourier path. Only two of the four possible combi-
nations will reveal all the information that Alice encoded
to Bob. The two remaining cases will not provide any
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
02
82
3v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
1 F
eb
 20
19
2Alice Bob
detectorspatial
encoding
basis
set
basis
set
I
F
single-photon
II
IF
FF
FI F
I
FI
basis combinations
FIG. 1. Illustration of our spatial encoding and decoding scheme and possible basis choices therein. The single-photon state
|1〉 is encoded in the x,y- translation basis formed by shifting a focus over a two-dimensional grid. Alice can send an image
of the focus (I) or its Fourier transform (F) to Bob. Bob randomly switches between the two bases I and F. Only if the two
bases are compatible (II or FF), the information encoded by Alice can be read out by Bob. In the two other cases (IF or FI),
the information is low. Just like in BB84, a public channel is used for post processing including revealing the bases choices,
detection of eavesdropping, error correction and privacy amplification.
information.
III. RESULTS
First, we characterize the information content of the
transmission from Alice to Bob. For this purpose, we an-
alyze the two compatible bases choices of Alice and Bob
(II and FF). Alice sends each symbol x out of her alpha-
bet X individually, while Bob receives the symbol y out
of the alphabet Y . Per symbol 1000 images are recorded
on Bob’s side. This step is performed for both compat-
ible bases. In Fig. 2 the number of photons detected
per symbol is shown in a log-log plot. In this figure, the
joint probability function p(x, y) is sampled, where x is
an element of the sent alphabet X and y from the re-
ceived alphabet Y . We quantify the shared information
between Alice and Bob by the mutual information [32]
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X, y∈Y
p(x, y) log2
(
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
)
, (1)
where p(y) is the probability to measure symbol y and
p(x) the probability of a sent symbol x. The maximum
information Alice can send per symbol is I(Alice) =
10 bit. Due to noise in the channel and in the detec-
tion and imperfections in the information encoding, the
shared information between Alice and Bob is smaller. For
the II and FF basis configuration, we calculated the sam-
pled mutual information to be I(X : Y )II = 8.3 bit and
I(X : Y )FF = 8.1 bit, respectively. The two main contri-
butions to the noise are the cross talk to the neighboring
detection areas, which was 13.3% and the dark counts of
the detector which was 13.8%.
Despite considerable experimental efforts, the proba-
bilities used in the calculation of the mutual information
are under-sampled with an average of 73 detection events
per symbol. This means that neighboring pixel cross-
talk events are not accurately sampled, a problem that
gets increasingly severe for larger alphabets. If Eve uses
an optimal cloner [33], the minimum fidelity for cloning-
based individual attacks is 51.6% [15]. Introducing the
average symbol hit probability F , the mutual information
in equation (1) can be simplified to
I(F ) = log2(d) + F log2(F )
+ (1− F ) log2
(
1− F
d− 1
)
, (2)
where d is the dimensionality of the basis. In our exper-
iment, F = 68.7%. Since a large portion of the photons
hits the neighboring areas, equation (2) is an underesti-
mate and can be refined by adding the hit probabilities
P0, P1, P2 and Prest defined in the top left corner of Fig.
2. We assume the values P0, P1, P2 and Prest are equal
for each symbol and derive
IAB = log2(d)
+ P0 log2(P0) + P1 log2
(
P1
4
)
+ P2 log2
(
P2
8
)
+ Prest log2
(
Prest
d− 13
)
. (3)
The resulting mutual information is 6.75±0.08 bit in the
II configuration and 7.03± 0.04 bit in the FF configura-
tion.
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FIG. 2. Correlation map of the received symbol index versus
the sent symbol index on a logarithmic scale in II configura-
tion. The diagonal line indicates a strong correlation between
the sent and the received symbols. In the top left corner, the
hit distribution to the nearest and next-nearest neighbor sym-
bols is shown. The events are visible in the correlation map as
the lines shifted by the number of columns of the map. The
average hit probability of the target area (red) is P0, that of
the four nearest neighbors (blue) is P1, that of the eight next
nearest neighbors (white) P2. The remaining probability is
summed in Prest = 1− P0 − P1 − P2.
IV. DISCUSSION
We use Gaussian optics in our setup. As a result, we
have Gaussian foci with finite width in the focus plane.
The width results in crosstalk to the neighboring sym-
bols, which reduces the mutual information as seen in
equation (3). This mutual information results from av-
eraging over the whole alphabet and is a lower bound
for the security analysis. One important criterion for
the security of QKD is that the basis choice of Alice
remains hidden from Eve. In quantum mechanics or-
thogonal states can be distinguished. Therefore, if the
attacker knows which of the two mutual unbiased bases
is used, he can read out and resend the symbol without
introducing errors. The Fourier transform of a Gaussian
function is another Gaussian function, as seen in Fig. 3.
In the Fourier basis, the probability to detect a photon is
higher in the center than at the edges. If Alice sends all
symbols of her alphabet with the same probability, Eve
could therefore make a reasonable guess which basis is
used. A photon detection at the edge of the detector is
more likely to have been sent in the imaging basis, while
a detection in the center is more likely in the Fourier
basis. We measured the photon hit distribution for the
two incompatible bases choices IF and FI with the same
parameters as in the compatible case. In Fig. 3, the
distribution is shown with a Gaussian fit. The width
in the columns is 89.9 ± 1.7 pixel and 106.7 ± 1.9 pixel
in the rows together with 96.3 ± 2.5 pixel and 102 ± 3
pixel in the FI configuration. To close the leak, Alice
can adjust her send probability p(k) to this Gaussian
distribution. As a result, the information sent by Alice
I(Alice) = −∑d−1k=0 p(k) log2(p(k)) reduces from 10 bit
to I(Alice)II = 9.4 bit and I(Alice)FF = 9.4 bit. Conse-
quently, the sampled mutual information with the hidden
basis drops to [26]
Ihb = I(Alice) +
d−1∑
k=0
p(k)Feff log2(Feff)
+
d−1∑
k=0
d−1∑
j=0,j 6=k
p(k)(1− Feff)p(j)
1− p(k) log2
(
(1− Feff)p(j)
1− p(k)
)
(4)
with the effective fidelity Feff defined by I(Feff) = IAB in
combining equation (2) and (3). This results in (Feff)II =
75.5% and (Feff)FF = 77.9% leading to (Ihb)II = 6.3 bit
and (Ihb)FF = 6.6 bit.
FIG. 3. Image integrated over all Bob’s 1024 different spot
positions in the IF configuration. Projections of the signal are
shown left of and below the plot by summing over the columns
(lower panel) and rows (left panel). The photon counts follow
a Gaussian spatial distribution as is evident from the red fit
curves.
In a postprocessing step via the public channel, Alice
and Bob reveal their basis choices. They only keep the
measurement results if they measured in two compatible
4bases, which bisects the key length. To check for eaves-
dropping, the quantum bit error rate of this sifted key
needs to be calculated. We used the Gray code [34] to
encode the x and y position of the symbol in a bit string.
In this way we reduce the bit error rate, since 31.3% of
the error is due to crosstalk to neighboring symbols. In
the Gray code, neighboring symbols have a Hamming
distance of only 1. We calculated the averaged quantum
bit error rate over all symbols to be QII = 7.8% for the
II configuration and QFF = 7.4% for the FF configura-
tion. We calculated the secret fraction of the key in case
of intercept-resend attacks and infinite key length in the
supplemental material.
FIG. 4. The lower bound of the secret-key rate rNper detected
photon as a function of the logarithm of the key length N
(red). The blue dashed line represents the asymptotic limit
of infinite key length. The failure probabilities are EC = 10
−5
and PA = 2
−15. The quantum bit error rate is Q = 0.08.
In order to analyse security arguments against collec-
tive attacks, we used finite-key considerations given in
[35–37]. In the case of a finite key length, N < ∞, fail-
ure probabilities in each step of postprocessing need to
be considered. After sifting the key and removing the in-
compatible basis choices of Alice and Bob, the key length
bisects. From this reduced key length, half the symbols
are used to check for the presence of an eavesdropper.
The next step is error correction to achieve an error-free
key. Due to the finite key length the error correction
has a finite failure probability and not all errors can be
removed. Assuming a two-way cascade code [38], this
failure probability is EC ∼ 10−5 [39, 40] in case of a
8% bit error rate. To limit the maximum information of
Eve, a privacy amplification step needs to be performed.
With average bound privacy amplification [41, 42], the
information of Eve can be bound to 3× 10−10 bit with a
failure probability of PA = 2
−15. In this case, the lower
bound for the secret-key rate per photon of a  = 10−5
secure key is given by [35–37]
rN =
n
N
(
IAB − I(Eve)− 1
n
log2(
2
EC
)− 2
n
log2(
1
PA
)
)
.
(5)
We neglect the failure probability introduced by
smoothening the entropies. If both bases are used with
equal probability, n = 0.25N symbols can be used to cre-
ate a key while m = 0.25N symbols are used for parame-
ter estimation to detect the presence of an eavesdropper.
IAB is defined in equation (3) and is the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob and
I(Eve) = −(1− F + ∆F/√m) log2(
1− F + ∆F/√m
d− 1 )
− (F −∆F/√m) log2(F −∆F/
√
m) (6)
is Eve’s information assuming all channel errors are at-
tributed to the presence of an eavesdropper [15]. We as-
sume the worst-case values in parameter estimation for
the fidelity F by taking the standard deviation ∆F of the
measured fidelity into account. This uncertainty in the
fidelity is reduced by taking larger samples m for param-
eter estimation. The remaining terms in equation (5) are
the influence of the failure probabilities on the secret-key
rate.
Figure 4 shows the minimum secret-key rate as a func-
tion of the number of symbols. With increasing key
length, the secret-key rate approaches its asymptotic
limit, which is the difference between the shared infor-
mation between Alice and Bob and the information of
Eve. As seen in the figure, we can establish a non-zero
secret-key rate starting from a key length of 5 · 103 sym-
bols. Assuming an SLM with a maximum frame rate of
60 fps, such a key can be generated in ≈ 3 minutes. The
secure key rate per photon asymptotically approaches
0.58 bit per photon. With the overall losses throughout
the setup averaged over the four possible bases of 18.2%
and a quantum efficiency of our ICCD detector of 28%,
we end up with a final secure key rate of 8 bit per second.
This rate can be improved by replacing the SLM in our
setup by galvo mirrors. With an ICCD with 5000 fps the
final key rate can go up to 660 bit per second.
In principle, there could be a security loophole caused
by the limited measurement range of the detection sys-
tem, which is in our case the finite aperture of the ICCD
[43]. However, with the SLM we have full control of
the prepared wavefronts and can therefore avoid that
the light falls outside the detector. For the Fourier-
transformed light, straightforward additional spatial fil-
tering can be applied by Alice to not overfill Bob’s de-
tector and avoid this loophole.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate high-
dimensional QKD using spatially encoded photons. We
encode an alphabet of 1024 symbols and achieve a chan-
nel capacity of 7 bit per detected photon. We discuss a
solution to hide Alice’s basis choice from Eve. Taking
error correction and privacy amplification into account
for finite key length, we show a secret-key fraction of
0.5 bit per photon. For longer-distance communication,
5the combination of this work with multimode fibers [44]
appears attractive.
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7VI. SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
A. Setup
Our setup consists of a single-photon source, a spa-
tial encoder, optics, the free-space quantum channel be-
tween Alice and Bob and finally a decoder together
with a single-photon-sensitive position-reading detector
on Bob’s side. The setup is schematically shown in
Fig. 5. We use spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC) [31, 45] as a source of photon pairs, here called
signal and herald. The wavelength of the generated pho-
tons is 790 nm with a heralded single-photon count rate
of 280 kHz and a coincidence probability of 10% mea-
sured with two avalanche photodiodes (APDs). The low
single-photon count rate ensures a probability of less than
0.1% to have more than one photon pair per pulse. The
photon in the herald arm is detected by one of the APDs
and signals a successful photon pair creation. The signal
photon is sent through a 77 m single-mode fiber (SMF) to
add an optical delay. The fiber output coupler (Thorlabs
F220FC-780) and a 75 mm lens together with a 300 mm
lens expand the light to a collimated beam of 8.4 mm
FWHM to match the size of the spatial light modula-
tor (SLM). We use a phase-only liquid-crystal SLM to
write a blazed grating in the phase of the wavefront. A
500 mm lens focuses the light to distinct x,y positions
in its focal plane. With a half-wave plate and a polar-
izing beam splitter (PBS), Alice can switch between the
two mutually unbiased bases. One basis is designed for
imaging the light in a 4f configuration with two 125 mm
lenses. The other one performs a Fourier transform with
a single lens with twice the focal length. Since the basis
choice needs to be hidden from an eavesdropper, a second
half-wave plate is put after Alice’s last PBS to counter-
act the polarization rotation of the first half-wave plate.
After being transmitted via the quantum channel with
two lenses (f = 50 mm), the photons are randomly split
by a beam splitter (BS) and are again guided through an
imaging or a Fourier transform path for decoding. The
half-wave plate in the Fourier path ensures that all the
light is reflected to the intensified charged-coupled de-
tector (ICCD). The ICCD is triggered via a 5 m BNC
cable to match the detection window of the camera to
the arrival of the signal photon.
B. Detection
To detect the photons in a two-dimensional grid, we
use an ICCD (Lambert HICAM 500S). It consists of
an intensifier stage fiber-coupled to a CMOS camera of
1280×1024 pixels. The photocathode of the ICCD acts as
a gate and is triggered by the herald photons at 280 kHz.
The delay between the trigger signal and the signal pho-
ton was measured to be 91 ns. The gate width of the
intensifier is 5 ns. The CMOS camera is read out with
500 frames per second. The variance of the read-out noise
of the CMOS is 0.4 counts and a threshold of 5 counts
is set to filter the readout noise from the data. More-
over, a threshold on the size and intensity of detection
events is set to between 2 and 10 pixels and between 1
and 60 counts, respectively, to remove unwanted spurious
ion events.
C. Trojan-horse attacks
The quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob could
be used as a door by an eavesdropper to read out the state
of Alice’s and Bob’s devices, making the setup vulnera-
ble against Trojan-horse attacks [46]. To counteract such
attacks, the optical devices should only be active when
the photons are sent. In our setup that could be realized
by replacing the mechanical switch of the half-wave plate
with a fast electro-optic modulator and the liquid-crystal
SLM by a faster digital micromirror device. They could
be synchronized to the photon arrival. Another counter-
measure is to use bandpass filters and optical isolators
at the entrance of Alice’s device. Alice should also use
auxiliary detectors to detect any light entering her device
to detect attacks. In the finite-key regime the security of
leaky decoy-state BB84 has been investigated [47].
D. Intercept-resend attack
In this attack, Eve intercepts a fraction η of the quan-
tum states and performs projective measurements ran-
domly choosing one of the two mutually unbiased bases.
Eve resends her measurement result, introducing an er-
ror due to the collapse of the wavefunction. For the secu-
rity of the protocol, we need to ensure that the informa-
tion Eve can gain from intercepting the communication is
lower than the mutual information between sender and
receiver [16, 17]. Assuming an intercept-resend attack,
the information Eve can learn is I(Eve) = η2 I(Alice) with
η the fraction of intercepted photons and I(Alice) the
sent information of Alice. Averaged over the compatible
bases, we find I(Alice) = 9.4 bit. An eavesdropper can
extract a maximum of I(Eve) = η5.72 bit. Therefore,
just as in the case of the original BB84, information gain
is only possible at the expense of disturbing the signal
[32]. An eavesdropper will be recognized in postprocess-
ing, since he collapses the wavefunction and thereby in-
creases the error rate of the key generated by Alice and
Bob. Alice and Bob will have to compare a random part
of their key to decide if they have been eavesdropped. In-
tercepting a fraction of η photons, an attacker introduces
an error of
EEve =
η
2
d− 1
d
, (7)
where d is the number of symbols. To calculate the quan-
tum bit error rate of the sifted key, we used the Gray
code [34] to encode the x and y position of the symbol
8FIG. 5. Schematic representation of the setup. We generate photon pairs at 790 nm by spontaneous parametric down-conversion
(SPDC). One of the photons is coupled into a single-mode fiber (SMF) and the other is sent to an avalanche photodiode (APD)
and used to trigger the camera. Information is encoded into the signal photon by translating the x and y position of the
focus with a spatial light modulator (SLM) and a 500 mm lens. Alice chooses between two paths with a half-wave plate and
a polarizing beam splitter (PBS), one (green) with a single lens (2f) and one (red) with two lenses (f). After the two beams
are merged again by a second PBS and the polarization information is erased by a second half-wave plate, the light is guided
through the quantum channel (QC) with two 50 mm lenses. Bob has the same set of lenses as Alice. His two paths are chosen
randomly by a beam splitter (BS). The additional half-wave plate makes sure that all the light is directed to the camera (ICCD)
by the last PBS.
in a bit string. In this way, we reduce the bit error rate,
since 31.3% of the error is due to crosstalk to neighbor-
ing symbols. In the Gray code, neighboring symbols have
a minimum hamming distance of 1. We calculated the
averaged quantum bit error rate over all symbols to be
QII = 0.078 with a standard deviation of ∆QII = 0.042
for II configuration and QFF = 0.074 and ∆QFF = 0.029
for FF configuration. We assume Alice and Bob set their
threshold to detect eavesdropping to a bit error rate of
Q + σ, where Q is the averaged quantum bit error rate.
In this case Eve could only intercept a fraction η of the
photons.
E. Basis guess fidelity
In practical QKD, Alice’s basis choice could leak to an
eavesdropper via side channels or imperfect encoding. To
include this into the model, we added a guess fidelity of
. Eve can not guess the basis if  = 0, while  = 1 means
that Eve knows Alice’s basis choice. In our experiment,
we measured  ∼ 0.15 by a correlation measurement per-
formed with classical light. Eve can then extract the
information
I(Eve) =
η
2
(1 + ) I(Alice) (8)
from what Alice sends. Thereby she adds an additional
error of
QEve =
1
2
(1− ) d− 1
d
. (9)
To detect eavesdropping, Alice and Bob must set an error
threshold σ. The error rate introduced by Eve’s pertur-
bation of the quantum channel has to be lower than this
threshold to stay unnoticed. The quantum bit error rate
including an eavesdropper is
QTotal = (1− η)Q+ η (Q+ (1−Q)QEve) (10)
= Q+ (1−Q)ηQEve. (11)
From the relation
QTotal ≤ Q+ σ, (12)
the maximum fraction of intercepted photons is
ηmax =
σ
(1−Q)QEve , (13)
9which depends on the fidelity to guess the correct basis
 and the threshold σ. The minimum fidelity between
Alice and Bob reduces from F to
FTotal = F (1− ηQEve) . (14)
Now it is possible to calculate the distance of information
between Bob and Eve, which is a measure for the secure
key rate. The information distance is defined as
δ = IAB − I(Eve). (15)
The amount of information Bob receives depends on the
amount of information Alice transmits and on the chan-
nel noise. Therefore
I(Bob) = QTotalI(Alice). (16)
Combining equation (8) and (16), the information dis-
tance can be written as
δ =
[
(1−QTotal)− η
2
(1 + )
]
I(Alice). (17)
By substituting ηmax from equation (13) to this expres-
sion, the minimum information distance can be plotted
as a function of  and σ in figure 6. Compared to equation
(5) in the main article the prefactor n/N does not appear,
since already a small fraction of the key is enough for pa-
rameter estimation. Moreover, the error correction and
parameter estimation as well as the uncertainties about
Eve’s entropies lower the secret fraction.
FIG. 6. The minimum secret information distance δ against
the basis guess fidelity  for three different thresholds σ.
The information distance δ grows monotonically with
decreasing threshold σ, but becomes smaller with increas-
ing , as visible in Fig. 6. If Eve knows Alice’s ba-
sis choice ( = 1), her measurements will no longer add
noise, which allows here to intercept the quantum com-
munication without being detected. In comparison to the
finite-key-length secret fraction in the case of collective
attacks, the values the minimum secret information δ is
larger.
